



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

## Edinburgh Research Explorer

### Musonius Rufus, Cleanthes, and the Stoic community at Rome

**Citation for published version:**

Harriman, B 2020, 'Musonius Rufus, Cleanthes, and the Stoic community at Rome', *Elenchos*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 71-104. <https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2020-0004> |

**Digital Object Identifier (DOI):**

[10.1515/elen-2020-0004](https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2020-0004) |

**Link:**

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

**Document Version:**

Peer reviewed version

**Published In:**

Elenchos

**General rights**

Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

**Take down policy**

The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [openaccess@ed.ac.uk](mailto:openaccess@ed.ac.uk) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



## *Musonius Rufus, Cleanthes, and the Stoic Community at Rome*

### *Introduction*

The impact of Musonius Rufus on the intellectual life of first-century CE Rome is well attested. He was the teacher of Epictetus, Euphrates, Dio of Prusa, and we learn that he influenced many other prominent figures of the period in one way or another.<sup>1</sup> Pliny the Younger, for example, discusses his admiration for the philosopher; Fronto, the Stoic Marcus Aurelius' teacher, numbers his own instructor, Athenodotus, among Musonius' pupils.<sup>2</sup> We can detect then a direct philosophical line from Musonius to two of the most prominent representatives of Stoic thinking in the first and second centuries CE: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

Yet Musonius' own Stoic credentials are less certain than we might expect.<sup>3</sup> Brad Inwood in a bold, but not wholly unprecedented, recent essay suggests it is a mistake to take Musonius as a canonical Stoic.<sup>4</sup> While there are certainly signs of significant Stoic influence on Musonius' ethics, particularly on the evaluation of *indifferents*, much of the evidence is merely *compatible* with Stoicism, rather than *distinctively* Stoic. On this line, Musonius should be understood as a 'public intellectual' who participated in the broader realm of elite educated culture as one influenced by Stoicism but not representative of only, or even primarily, that school.<sup>5</sup> Such a view, of course, fits neatly with the changing landscape of the period where the schools in Athens were in decline and philosophical inquiry had become more eclectic, as well as less centralised.<sup>6</sup>

Along similar lines, Van Geytenbeek has argued that it is doubtful whether Musonius had access to the early Stoic texts of Zeno and Cleanthes. Clearly, orthodox Stoic teaching is an important source material for Musonius, but Van Geytenbeek despairs of finding very many specific instances of Stoic influence.<sup>7</sup> Such a view is perhaps not surprising given the state of

---

<sup>1</sup> See Epic. *Dis.* I.7.32. For Musonius' biography, see Lutz (1947) 3-30; Hense (1905) xiv-xxxvi; Van Geytenbeek (1963) 22-50; and Goulet-Cazé (2005) 555-72.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.* 3.11, *Ep. ad Verum* I, 1.4.

<sup>3</sup> Our earliest external evidence for Musonius' Stoicism is found in Tac. *Hist.* 3.81.1: "studium philosophiae et placita Stoicorum aemulatus". This does little to edify his precise relation with Stoicism, even if it does suggest the dominance of the Stoic influence on his thinking.

<sup>4</sup> Inwood (2017).

<sup>5</sup> Inwood understandably, but perhaps unhelpfully, avoids the question of eclecticism here.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Donini (1982) and Inwood (1995) 63-4. The biographies of both Cornutus and Epictetus attest to the changing character of Stoic philosophy in the first century.

<sup>7</sup> Van Geytenbeek (1963) 161-3. See pp. 15-21 for a review of the earlier scholarship on Musonius. Zeller's claim that much of the evidence suggests merely "eine Anwendung der bekannten stoischen Grundsätze" anticipates Inwood. In an unpublished dissertation, Houser echoes Van Geytenbeek's claim that determining the specific Stoic influence on Musonius is impossible because he is 'imprecise' and 'philosophically vague'.

our evidence. Musonius, like Socrates and Carneades, probably wrote nothing himself, and his fragments are a loose collection of twenty-one self-contained longer diatribes combined with a series of shorter quotations preserved by Stobaeus, Plutarch, Gellius, Aristides, and Arrian through Epictetus.<sup>8</sup>

Must we be content with understanding Musonius as a ‘Stoicizer’ rather than as a fully-fledged Stoic? Certainly, our evidence for Musonius suggests he did not engage in the sorts of technical, dialectical inquiries that make determining one’s philosophy pedigree straightforward; although, unlike Seneca, he does not appear actively to dismiss abstract pursuits like logic.<sup>9</sup> My suggestion in the following is that such a question cannot be addressed adequately if we are obliged to secure our answer on the basis of the absence of specific evidence of Musonius’ connection to earlier Stoicism. Simply put, taking Musonius’ fragments to be *generically* rather than *specifically* Stoic is necessarily partly a function of the state of our evidence. One might retort that we can only judge on the basis of the evidence we do have. Yet it is not clear that the fragments of Musonius are as unedifying in relation to this question as has been sometimes maintained.

This point, although questioned by Van Geytenbeek and, to some extent, by Inwood, has long been understood, and there have been various attempts to pinpoint Musonius’ Stoic influences. Some, for example, have looked for signs of Posidonius and Middle Stoicism in Musonius’ discussion of the relation between the body and the soul.<sup>10</sup> Many more have pointed to Antipater of Tarsus as a source for Musonius’ discussion of marriage and its centrality to his ethics.<sup>11</sup>

I begin here from a suggestive, if largely unsupported, statement from Adolf Dyroff’s nineteenth-century account of Stoic ethics: “Ferner müssen wir bedenken, Kleanthes zwischen Platon und Musonios liegt.”<sup>12</sup> Musonius Rufus is cast as the inheritor of Plato, mediated through the Stoic Cleanthes. Although it is denied by both Van Geytenbeek and Inwood, Cleanthes is an immediately attractive candidate for an early Stoic that might have had an especial influence on Musonius.<sup>13</sup> He is the only Stoic besides Zeno explicitly named (fr. I) in our collection of fragments, and Diogenes Laertius preserves a suggestive book title for Cleanthes on the equality of virtue in men and women (Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ

<sup>8</sup> Hense’s (1905) collection and text is still authoritative. I follow his text and numbering throughout.

<sup>9</sup> See XLIV. There are occasional instances of Stoic technical jargon, see XXIII, XXIV, XXXVIII, and XL.

<sup>10</sup> Schmekel (1892) 401, Hense (1905), xx, and Houser (1997) 35-9.

<sup>11</sup> Hense (1905) xx; Van Geytenbeek (1963) 162; Reydam-Schils (2005) 151-3; Laurand (2014) 296-302, 306-8, 314-5.

<sup>12</sup> Dyroff (1897) 313.

<sup>13</sup> Van Geytenbeek (1963) 56-7; Inwood (2017) 269 n. 37.

γυναικός) that immediately connects with Musonius' frs. III and IV on the education and philosophical aptitude of women.

Dyroff's argument for Cleanthes' special influence centres on Musonius' use of the epithets ἄμειπτος (faultless) and ἐπιμελής (caring) for virtuous women in fr. III. These two, hardly common, adjectives also appear in Cleanthes' epigram defining the good preserved by Clement (*SVF* I 557). Significantly, the two adjectives are absent from the similar list describing the Stoic conception of the good found in Diogenes' Zeno section (VII 98-101). An intriguing parallel but, as Van Geytenbeek notes, hardly definitive on its own.<sup>14</sup>

Yet Van Geytenbeek is surely wrong to suggest that 'hardly anything' in Cleanthes' fragments suggests Musonius. In the following, I read Musonius' fragments alongside our evidence for Cleanthes and earlier Stoics more generally. I will suggest a series of connections and echoes that seem to have escaped scholarly attention, at least in their full implications. Partly my task is to bring together various discussions in the literature and determine whether, when unified, a coherent picture of Musonius' attitude towards the Stoa emerges. My suggestions will not all carry the same security; some are more faintly present than others. Nor is the following intended to be an exhaustive survey of such connections. Yet, taken as a group, I maintain that they indicate that Cleanthes should be brought to the fore of any discussion of Musonius' intellectual heritage and his relation to Stoicism, however we construe it. We might, nevertheless, still doubt Musonius' inclusion among 'genuine' Stoics, but this cannot be on the basis of his apparent ignorance of orthodox Stoicism or the claimed ambiguity of his philosophical commitments. The following, then, is intended to sketch out an alternative account to Inwood's, while not, primarily, aiming to refute his main conclusion.

We might go even further and ask whether the categories of 'genuine' Stoics and 'mere' Stoicizers are of any real use for edifying the intellectual profile of Musonius. George Boys-Stones, in his recent work on Musonius' rough contemporary Cornutus, has adopted the notion of a 'textual community' to clarify the status of Stoicism in the first century.<sup>15</sup> This model attempts to account for philosophical activity in the midst of the decline of institutional authority (and its structures), and of the collapse of the importance of traditional centres of practice, by positing a community bound by a shared intellectual commitment to a corpus of

---

<sup>14</sup> Van Geytenbeek (1963) 56-7.

<sup>15</sup> Boys-Stones (2018) 9-13. The exact connection between Musonius and Cornutus is unclear, but it is very likely given their status in Rome that there was a relationship of some kind. It is sometimes said that both Musonius and Cornutus were exiled to the island of Gyara, but the evidence for this in the case of the latter is lacking.

texts.<sup>16</sup> In the case of Cornutus, Boys-Stones notes his strong engagement with the classics of first three heads of the Stoa—Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.<sup>17</sup>

Such a community, defined by its commitment to a set of texts, is sometimes presented as devoted to the ‘authority’ of these texts. This needs some qualification. It is not a commitment to the unarguable truth of a set of founding texts, nor does it entail the full acceptance of their philosophical agenda. We will see that the authority of Cleanthes and the early Stoics for Musonius needs to be understood under a weaker, but no less meaningful, rubric. Authority is not confirmed by a refusal to question directly the wisdom of the early Stoics; rather, the early corpus (with Cleanthes at its centre) is presented as the prime intellectual resource. Engaging with this resource actively is the mark of the membership of that community. Crucially, such engagement is not limited to favourable interpretations. Cornutus provides a telling example. As Boys-Stones and Most both note, the only predecessor Cornutus explicitly names, intriguingly, is Cleanthes, and this is done to register disagreement, gently presented.<sup>18</sup> If I am right about the importance of Cleanthes for Musonius, the prominence of the former’s name in his contemporary Cornutus should come as little surprise.<sup>19</sup> Although I do not undertake it here, provisionally speaking, a comparison between Musonius and Cornutus using Boys-Stones’s model of the Stoic ‘textual community’ of the first century is promising.

To take stock: I suggest we can detect a far subtler understanding and, indeed, appropriation of standard Stoic material in Musonius than has been appreciated. Accepting that Musonius did more than simply inherit nebulous, and largely non-specific, Stoicizing thinking, suggests he was a far more engaged recipient of the Stoic tradition than sceptics have maintained.

### ***Food, Digestion, and Philosophical Methodology***

In support of Dyroff’s linguistic approach, we might set the stage by looking at a verbal echo of Cleanthes in Musonius’ fragments that has received much attention in the study of the former but conspicuously less in relation to the latter. The echo relates to v.4 of Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus*; unfortunately, it is one of the least secure lines with a torrent of

---

<sup>16</sup> For the model of the ‘textual community’ as applied to Platonism, see Baltzly (2014) and Niehoff (2007).

<sup>17</sup> Boys-Stones points us to Suetonius’ *Life* (38-9) where Persius’ collection of the 700 or so books of Chrysippus and their inheritance by Cornutus are mentioned.

<sup>18</sup> 64.16; Boys-Stones (2018) 11, and Most (1989) 2015-6.

<sup>19</sup> Along these lines, we might also interpret the prominence of Cleanthes in Seneca’s *Ep.* 94.

textual-critical proposals.<sup>20</sup> The single surviving manuscript of the *Hymn* presents v.4 as follows: ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν † ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες. Either ἤχου or ἐσμὲν, or both, need to be emended to conform to metrical requirements.<sup>21</sup> The most frequently supported conjecture, first proposed by A.C. Pearson, corrects ἤχου with θεοῦ and reads γενόμεσθα for γένος ἐσμὲν.<sup>22</sup> Long and Sedley translate vv.4-5: ‘we are your offspring, and alone of all mortal creatures which are alive and tread the earth we bear a likeness to god.’<sup>23</sup>

This reading brings Musonius firmly into view. In fr. XVII, he claims: καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος **μίμημα** μὲν **θεοῦ** μόνοντῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς (In general, of all creatures on earth, man alone resembles god, and has the same virtues he has).<sup>24</sup> Taking Cleanthes’ v.4 together v.5 (μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν) suggests the obvious relevance of Musonius’ discussion of the unique relationship between humans and god, shared by no other mortal creature. As in Dyroff’s examples, we are left with an undeniable linguistic parallel; however, can we say anything more concrete?

We *can* further secure Cleanthes’ relevance by looking to fr. XVIII. This is one of two surviving fragments devoted to food and nutrition, and we find here the very same insistence on the uniquely close similarity between humans and gods, situated within a complex engagement with the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus:

τὴν μέντοι κρεώδη τροφήν θηριωδεστέραν ἀπέφηνε καὶ τοῖς ἀγρίοις ζώοις προσφορωτέραν. εἶναι δὲ ταύτην ἔλεγε καὶ βαρυτέραν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν τι καὶ φρονεῖν ἐμπόδιον· τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς θολωδεστέραν οὖσαν ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ· παρὸ καὶ βραδυτέρους φαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν τοὺς πλείονι ταύτῃ χρωμένους. δεῖν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ συγγενέστατον τοῖς θεοῖς τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ὁμοιότατα τρέφεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. ἐκείνοις μὲν οὖν ἀρκεῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀναφερομένους ἀτμούς, ἡμᾶς δ’ ὁμοιοτάτην ταύτῃ προσφέρεισθαι τροφήν ἃν εἶπεν τὴν κουφοτάτην καὶ καθαρωτάτην· οὕτω δ’ ἂν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν καθαρὰν τε καὶ ξηράν, ὅποια οὖσα ἀρίστη καὶ σοφωτάτη εἴη ἂν, καθάπερ Ἡρακλείτῳ δοκεῖ λέγοντι οὕτως ‘αὐγὴ ξερὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη’.

On the other hand, he showed that meat was a less civilised kind of food and more appropriate for wild animals. He held that it was a heavy food and an obstacle to thinking and reasoning, since the exhalations rising from it being turpid darkened the soul. For this reason also those who make larger use of it seem slower in intellect. *Furthermore, as man of all creatures on*

<sup>20</sup> See Thom (2005) 54-67 for his identification of some twenty-seven different groups of readings.

<sup>21</sup> Zuntz (1958) 292 makes this point.

<sup>22</sup> This text is adopted by many, including Powell (1925), Hopkinson (1988), Long and Sedley (1987), and Reydam-Schils (2017). Thom (2005) is largely favourable, although he declines to print this text. He provides an in-depth history of the development of this conjecture, first made via personal correspondence. The corruption of θεοῦ to ἤχου is ingenuously explained by positing an initial gloss of ἡ Χου (or of Christ) for θεοῦ.

<sup>23</sup> LS 2:327 take Musonius’ fr. XVII to provide ‘strong support’ for this reading.

<sup>24</sup> I follow Lutz’s translations, with some modifications, throughout.

*earth is closest in kin to the gods, so he should be nourished in a manner most like the gods.* Now the vapours rising from the earth and water are sufficient for them, and so, he said, we ought to be nourished on food most like that, the lightest and purest; for thus our souls would be pure and dry, and being so, would be finest and wisest, as it seemed to Heraclitus when he said, ‘The clear dry soul is wisest and best.’

Although the use of the superlative here (συγγενέστατον) suggests a slightly different relationship between the divine and the human than the claim of that relationship’s uniqueness found in fr. XVII, the primary point—the emphasis on divine and human resemblance—is repeated in similar terms; Cleanthes’ *Hymn* is still firmly in view. Indeed it is the Cleanthean parallel quoted from the *Hymn* between gods and humans that structures the microcosm-macrocosm connection that bridges cosmic nourishment via exhalation and its mortal counterpart. Just as the lightest and purest vapours sustain the gods, this standard Stoic belief provides us, so Musonius suggests, with a model to emulate in our own diets.<sup>25</sup>

The closest parallel for Musonius’ discussion of nutrition and his use of this microcosm-macrocosm model is found at Cicero’s *De natura deorum* II.42-43. Although this connection is standardly noted, its importance, I do not think, has been adequately appreciated.<sup>26</sup>

(42) For it may be observed that the inhabitants of those countries in which the air is pure and rarefied have keener wits and greater powers of understanding than persons who live in a dense and heavy climate; (43) moreover the substance employed as food is also believed to have some influence on mental acuteness; it is therefore likely that the stars possess surpassing intelligence, since they inhabit the ethereal region of the world and also are nourished by the moist vapours of sea and earth, rarefied in their passage through the wide intervening space. (Trans. Rackham)

Here we find Musonius’ point in reverse. Rather than beginning from a macrocosmic perspective, Cicero’s presentation moves from a point about nutrition and its influence on human intelligence outwards to a claim about cosmic intelligence as the product of exhalation. Yet the procedure of drawing out this connection, using the structural similarity at two different scales, is identical.

Cicero’s source for this discussion is not explicitly named, and it has been subject to some debate. The mention of Aristotle in §42 and the continuation of his discussion by Balbus at the start of §44 (Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus est...) suggests Cicero is retailing

<sup>25</sup> For the thought that the sun is an intelligent fiery mass fed by exhalations from the sea see: *SVF* 1.121, 1.501, 2.652, 2.650, 2.663, 2.655, and 2.656. This seems to have been agreed by all sides in the early Stoa.

<sup>26</sup> See, most recently, Laurand (2014) 158-60.

Aristotelian material throughout these sections.<sup>27</sup> The origin of these sections has often been supposed to be Aristotle's lost dialogue *De philosophia*. Jaeger, for example, has made the argument that what we find here is evidence of an early stage in his thought where Aristotle develops the idea that the stars must be intelligent because all the other elements contain life and the aether is the 'most suitable' of all to do so. An analogy is then drawn between the nutrition of earthly life and the stars on the basis of a notion of *pneuma*, which, Jaeger suggests, contains the kernel of the theory of Stoic vitalism.<sup>28</sup> The inspiration for such an analogy on this account is Plato's discussion of climate and nutrition and their psychological effects in the *Laws*.<sup>29</sup>

Reinhardt's suggestion is that only the last section of Cicero's presentation from §§42-44 should be attributed to Aristotle, as other material, Stoic in origin, has been added due to its similarity to what Cicero takes to be Aristotelian. His thesis is that Posidonius' doctrine of vital heat (*vis calor*), which he understands to be in the background of Cicero's earlier discussion at §§23-32, is reported by Cicero here.<sup>30</sup> Solmsen, conclusively in my view, has challenged Reinhardt's Posidonian maximalism and firmly asserted the importance of Cleanthes for this principle of Stoic physics and for his role as Cicero's source in *De natura deorum*.<sup>31</sup>

While I maintain, in line with Solmsen, that Reinhardt is incorrect to find and privilege traces of Posidonius in §§42-44, the notion that a Stoic source has coloured this section seems to be along the right lines and extending Solmsen's argument, *mutatis mutandis*, for a Cleanthean origin for §§42-43 is attractive.<sup>32</sup> As mentioned above, the notion of climactic or environmental effects on the intellect go back to Plato and beyond; however, Cicero has strongly tied his discussion of this theme in *ND* II with Chrysippus. At §17, in what appears to be a continuation of Balbus' discussion of Chrysippus in §16, we learn:

Again, do we not also understand that everything in a higher position is of greater value, and that the earth is the lowest thing, and is enveloped by a layer of the densest kind of air? Hence for the same reason what we observe to be the case with certain districts and cities, I mean that their inhabitants are duller-witted than the average owing to the more compressed quality of the atmosphere, has also befallen the human

---

<sup>27</sup> See Pease (1958) 640-1 for a useful discussion and overview of the debate.

<sup>28</sup> Jaeger (1934) 143-150.

<sup>29</sup> *Laws* 747D. See, too, *Epinomis* 981e and, particularly, *Timaeus* 24c4-d3. Bignone (1936) 353-4 suggests that the discussion of nutrition and exhalation in §43 goes back to Aristotle on the basis of the evidence of Damascius' commentary on the *Phaedo*, where Aristotle is attributed with a discussion of a man who lived on nothing but sunbeams (ἡλιακαῖς...μόναις τρεφόμενος) at I.530 and II.138 (Westerink). However, this is a rather different point and does little to support his attribution.

<sup>30</sup> Reinhardt (1921) 224-229 and (1926) 81. This was widely accepted at the time, cf. Pohlenz (1948) 215.

<sup>31</sup> Solmsen (1961). He does not preclude an intermediary role for Posidonius, but he does insist that Cicero's text confirms his understanding of Cleanthes' importance to the development of fire as the central Stoic sustaining and generative principle. This, of course, leaves open the familiar questions of the development of the role of *pneuma* in the early Stoa and whether Chrysippus' account meaningfully differed from that of Zeno and Cleanthes.

<sup>32</sup> Hahm (1977) 269-272 makes an argument for this attribution. What I offer here attempts to bolster his effort.



race as a whole owing to its being located on the earth, that is, in the densest region of the world. (Trans. Rackham)

Such a prominent, indeed teleological, role for location and climate within Stoic discussions of causality is also attributed to Chrysippus at *De fato* §§7-9, confirming this connection.<sup>33</sup>

This firmly brings the Stoics into view in this purportedly Aristotelian run of argument. We might think that the Chrysippean echo in §42 suggests a similar background for our main concern—the microcosm-macrocosm discussion of nutrition and exhalation—in §43. Yet there are several reasons to reject this assumption. One there is a marked break in the text between §42 and §43, indicated by the unusual placement of *cibo* at the start of the section (*quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant*). The grammatical case of *cibo* is ambiguous, but a compelling argument has been made by H.J. Roby that it should be taken as a predicative dative, as the word is at *Lucr.* 6.771.<sup>34</sup> The effect of this, as Mayor notes in his commentary, is that the subject matter of food is conspicuously noted, suggesting at least a change of tack from the narrow Chrysippean point about environmental determinism.

A second point is that immediately prior to the mention of Aristotle in §42, Cleanthes' view on the nourishment of the sun by vapours exhaled by the ocean is explicitly attributed to him and quoted in §40, crucially identifying the fire of the sun with the universal, sustaining fire of the bodies of living creatures in §41:

It follows that it (the sun) resembles either that fire which we employ in ordinary life or that which is contained in the bodies of living creatures. Now our ordinary fire that serves the needs of daily life is a destructive agency, consuming everything, and also wherever it spreads it routs and scatters everything. On the other hand the fire of the body is the glow of life and health; it is the universal preservative, giving nourishment, fostering growth, sustaining, bestowing sensation. (Trans. Rackham)

The structural similarity between the divine and the human, located in the sustaining fire, needed to generate the microcosm-macrocosm argument of §43 is already in place, and, for Cicero at least, distinctively Cleanthean. Further confirming Cleanthes' central importance is Cicero's earlier discussion, in §24, of the *vis caloris* of the body and its effect on the digestion of food. Here the point, as above, is on the universal role of *vis caloris* for all living beings.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> See Sedley (1993) 313-320, in particular. NB his emphasis on the importance of the *Phaedo* myth for Stoic discussions of atmospheric determination.

<sup>34</sup> This construal has been widely accepted. See Mayor (1880) 135-36 and Pease (1958) 640-41. Walsh (1997) 62 seems to follow suit.

<sup>35</sup> For an excellent analysis of this Cleanthes' use of analogies between microcosm and macrocosm, see Tieleman (1996) 90-96.

These factors make it highly likely that Cicero is presenting, in §43, something he associates closely with Cleanthes' physics. However, one might object that we are obliged to make no great distinction between Cleanthes and Chrysippus in Cicero's account here. Perhaps we might think that the lack of a marked source suggests agreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on Cicero's understanding.

Telling against such a position is that Chrysippus' interest in the causal role of the environment is to *oppose* the place of humans (in the densest and least favourable part) with that of superior (i.e. divine) beings. It is true that his account of the causal nexus of world incorporates both gods and men, but Chrysippus means to draw a distinction between their respective roles in the cosmos.<sup>36</sup> The basis of the point made by Cleanthes in §§40-41, and in our passage from §43, is that an *analogy* may be drawn between the microcosm of human or animal nutrition and the macrocosm of cosmic nourishment by exhalation. This is markedly different from what Cicero attributes to Chrysippus earlier in this text and in the *De fato*.

We have wandered some distance from Musonius Rufus; however, Cicero's version of the argument in fr. XVIIIa goes some way towards confirming the importance of Cleanthes here. This is not, of course, to suggest that Musonius is merely repeating Cleanthean material. It is just as likely that he is reworking the familiar macrocosm-microcosm analogy, which Cicero so clearly attributes to Cleanthes, for his own ends. Indeed Musonius' quotation of Heraclitus suggests this possibility.

It is firmly established that Heraclitus played a pre-eminent role as an acknowledged predecessor in the early development of the Stoa, particularly in the areas of physics and psychology.<sup>37</sup> Obviously relevant for us is the well-studied text from Arius Didymus preserving Heraclitus' B12, presented in the context of an attempt by Cleanthes to strengthen and interpret Zeno's psychology.<sup>38</sup> There, as in Musonius, we find a discussion of *anathumiasis* and the constitution of soul, supported by a direct appeal to Heraclitus. So, too, do we find analogical reasoning toggling between the microcosm of the human soul and a larger macrocosm deployed to clarify the former.

Associating Heraclitus' psychology with *anathumiasis* goes back to Aristotle,<sup>39</sup> and a particularly useful text on Heraclitus and food is found in the Peripatetic *Problemata*:

---

<sup>36</sup> Sedley (1996) 319-20 makes this point.

<sup>37</sup> Long (1996) is the classic account. That Cleanthes should be credited with emphasizing Heraclitus seems likely. We find works attributed to Cleanthes and his pupil, Sphaerus, on Heraclitus in Diogenes (7.174; 7.178), and Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* clearly owes much to Heraclitean language and thought.

<sup>38</sup> *SVF* 1.519.

<sup>39</sup> *De anima* 405a25-29.

Why, if someone eats garlic, does the urine have an odor, but when other things having a strong smell are eaten it does not have an odor? Is it because, just as some of the Heracliteans say, vaporizing takes place in the body just as it does in the universe, and then when it has cooled again there is condensation (moisture in the one case, urine in the other), and the vaporization from the nourishment, out of which this mixture comes, produces the smell?<sup>40</sup> (Trans. Mayhew)

Putting aside the question of how these ‘Heracliteans’ relate to Heraclitus himself, we find the same analogy between internal and external exhalations made by Musonius, put into the context of digestion and nutrition.<sup>41</sup> Indeed arguing by using such a move is explicitly attributed to the Heracliteans, suggesting a strong link with our passage from Musonius and explaining the value of quoting Heraclitus. In view of Cleanthes’ interest in Heraclitus and *anathumiasis* in Arius Didymus and further evidence from the *Problemata* that these ‘Heracliteans’ made the familiar Stoic claim that ‘sun is nourished by exhaling from the sea’,<sup>42</sup> it is tempting, as Mansfeld acknowledges, to think that this group simply is the early Stoics.<sup>43</sup> If this is along the right lines, Musonius is working with venerable Stoic material, most closely associated with Cleanthes, connecting nutrition, *anathumiasis* deployed in a microcosm-macrocosm analogy, and Heraclitus’ psychology.

We might ask, then, to what end has Musonius presented this argument? We get a better sense of its place if we look to his following discussion of Zeno.

Ζήνων δέ γε ὁ Κιτιεὺς οὐδὲ νοσῶν ᾤετο δεῖν τροφήν προσφέρεισθαι τρυφερωτέραν, ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ ὁ θεραπεύων ἰατρὸς ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν φαγεῖν νεοττὸν περιστερᾶς, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος ‘ὥς Μάνην’ ἔφη ‘με θεράπευε.’ ἡξίου γάρ, οἶμαι, μηδὲν μαλακώτερον ἐν τῇ θεραπείᾳ γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν δούλων τινὶ νοσοῦντι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι θεραπεύεσθαι δύνανται δίχα τοῦ τροφήν λαμβάνειν πολυτελεστέραν, δύνασθαι ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς. δεῖ γὰρ μηδαμῶς τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα δούλου μηδενὸς εἶναι μαλακώτερον. διόπερ ὁ Ζήνων εἰκότως ἡξίου εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὴν πολυτέλειαν ἐν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ μηδ’ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον ἐνδιδόναι πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ περ ὁ ἐνδοὺς ἅπαξ προέλθοι ἂν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, ἅτε τῆς ἡδονῆς πολλὴν ἐχούσης αὕξησιν ἐν τε πόμασι καὶ βρώμασι.<sup>44</sup>

Zeno of Citium even when he was ill thought that no unusually delicate food should be brought him, and when the attending physician ordered him to eat squab, he would not allow it, and said, ‘Treat me as you would my slave Manes.’ For I imagine he thought there should be nothing more delicate in his treatment than for one of his slaves if he were will; for if they can be cured without receiving more delicate fare, so can we. Surely a good man should be no more delicate than a slave; and for that reason Zeno very likely thought he ought to be beware of delicacy of diet and not yield to it in the

<sup>40</sup> XIII.6 908a28-34.

<sup>41</sup> See Mansfeld (2015) 65-71 for a discussion of the evidence for both types of exhalation in our fragments of Heraclitus. He takes B12, against some opposition, to confirm, at the very least, the internal sort.

<sup>42</sup> XXIII.30 934b33-6.

<sup>43</sup> Mansfeld (2015) 72.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. DL VII 19.

least, for if he once yielded he would go the whole way, since in manner of food and drink, pleasure accelerates its pace alarmingly.

This Zenonian argument sits uneasily with Musonius' previous insistence on taking our model of nutrition from the gods. This is not because we are meant to associate Zeno's 'more delicate' (τρυφερωτέραν) food with the earlier 'lightest and purest (τὴν κουφοτάτην καὶ καθαρωτάτην) type in the Cleanthean analogy. On the surface, at least, pursuing the latter is perfectly compatible with avoiding the former. On Musonius' account, Zeno clearly has in mind the damaging pursuit of the pleasure of gastronomic specialities, which is never satisfied and only serves to prompt further desire. Yet the substance of the quotation from Zeno here suggests a rather different point. It is not only that such rich specialities as squab<sup>45</sup> are to be avoided, but also that special attention *tout court* to food is suspect. Food eaten by slaves is perfectly suitable for the *sapiens*.

It is this second point that receives vigorous treatment in fr. XVIIIb, the companion essay to the fragment under consideration. Here, in a strident attack on deriving pleasure from food in any form, Musonius insists that *gourmanderie* is the most pernicious of hedonistic pursuits.<sup>46</sup> Meal time is beset by many dangers that might result in succumbing irreversibly to pleasure (καὶ μὴν καθ' ἐκάστην προσφορὰν τροφῆς, οὐχ εἷς κίνδυνος ἀμαρτήματος, ἀλλὰ πλείονες). He concludes that minimising our attention to the matter of food is what is required. Thus we learn that the cheapest food is best and most nutritious; what is easiest to procure, or simply at hand, most choice-worthy for the good man.<sup>47</sup>

With this further context in mind, it is apparent that we have two distinct approaches to the ethics of food, associated with the first two Stoic *scholarchs*. In the Cleanthean view, we are to derive our attitude to eating using the practical application of the central Stoic principle of human similarity to the divine.<sup>48</sup> It is this principle that lies behind Cleanthes' analogy

<sup>45</sup> Lutz's translation of νεοττὸν περιστερᾶς as 'squab' is, strictly speaking, accurate, but Musonius' νεοττός serves to emphasize the youth and delicacy of the pigeon. Indeed, this word is also used for an egg, as in the famous description of the parts of Stoic philosophy, explained using the analogy of the parts an egg at S.E. *M* 7.16-19.

<sup>46</sup> ὅτι πολλῶν ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν, αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναπείθουσιν ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ ἐνδιδόναι αὐταῖς βιάζονται παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον, δυσμαχωτάτη εἶναι κινδυνεύει πασῶν ἢ περὶ τροφὴν ἡδονή. Contrast Sen. *Ep.* 18.10 where spells of an ascetic diet are said to allow one to derive pleasure from even a very modest meal. Musonius allows no place for such hedonistic reasoning, even on Seneca's minimalist line, at meal time; cf., however, fr. XXIV.

<sup>47</sup> καίτοι κἂν ἐπ' ἴσον ἢ τε πολυτελεῆς καὶ ἡ εὐτελεῆς τροφή ῥωννύη τὸ σῶμα, ὅμως αἰρετέον ἐστὶ τὴν εὐτελεῆ, ὅτι αὕτη σωφρονικωτέρα καὶ πρέπει ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον.

<sup>48</sup> By 'Cleanthean' I don't mean to attribute necessarily this argument about food to the historical Cleanthes, although it is possible that it reflects something genuine; see below. The point is rather that material associated with Cleanthes' natural philosophy is being exploited by Musonius.

between the human body and the divine sun, considered above, and in the standard Stoic belief in the relation between the divine logos and the individual human soul as whole to part.<sup>49</sup>

The Cleanthean perspective on everyday decisions about food depends upon a distinctly theoretical approach to moral reasoning. In this respect, it is significant that Cleanthes is attributed with a unique understanding of the formulation of the Stoic *telos*: unlike Chrysippus, Cleanthes discounts ‘human nature’ in the command to live in accordance with nature. Universal nature is sufficient to guide action without reference to the human part; universal theory, in short, is enough.<sup>50</sup> Zeno’s method proceeds from more prosaic beginnings, but it has the virtue of attending to the practical effects of the human pursuit of pleasure.

Why raise these two perspectives? An answer to this question may be found in Musonius’ remarks on *askêsis* (training). In his important fr. VI, Musonius makes an argument for the integration of theoretical knowledge and practical exercise.<sup>51</sup> For him, this is a question of the appropriate application of principles (θεωρήματα), by using precepts (μαθήματα)<sup>52</sup> relevant to virtuous action, knowledgably and scrupulously. Theoretical knowledge is insufficient without an understanding of how this can be translated into virtuous action. As an example, the difficulty of avoiding the perils of pleasure when equipped with only a precept demanding these be resisted is raised (ἐπεὶ πῶς μὲν ἂν εὐθὺς γένοιτό τις σώφρων, εἰ μόνον εἰδείη ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν, ἀγύμναστος δ’ εἴη ἀντέχειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς;).

There are obvious overlaps here with Seneca’s discussion of the value of *praecepta* and *decreta* in his *Eps.* 94 and 95, perhaps not coincidentally cast as a report of an early Stoic debate between Cleanthes and the heterodox Stoic Aristo.<sup>53</sup> Indeed Musonius seems to be entering here into a discussion related to the Stoic interest in *kathêkonta* (obligations, or proper functions) and their attendant precepts meant to guide moral choice about action, which occupied the school from its inception.<sup>54</sup> Yet Musonius’ discussion does *not* focus on the much-

<sup>49</sup> DL VII 156=SVF II 774. Mansfeld (2015) 74 helpfully cites Seneca’s *Ep.* 66.12 (ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa).

<sup>50</sup> DL VII 89=SVF II.555.

<sup>51</sup> Sellars (2007) provides an excellent account of how theoretical knowledge (*logos*) and practical exercise (*askêsis*) are connected in Musonius and ‘Roman’ Stoicism. See also Geytenbeek (1963) 40-50.

<sup>52</sup> I translate μαθήματα, with Lutz, as ‘precepts’ and not merely as ‘teachings’. This is suggested by the examples Musonius gives; these are moral edicts constructed using the language of obligation (χρή), conforming to the standard Stoic models of moral precepts; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 95.

<sup>53</sup> A thorough discussion of this letter can be found in Inwood (1999). There has been some debate about whether this letter preserves actual debate between Cleanthes and Aristo, cf. Sedley (1999) 132 n. 12. For our purposes, a more apposite question might be what value Seneca seeks, framing the debate as he does.

<sup>54</sup> The importance of rules within moral reasoning for the Stoics has been much discussed; see Kidd (1978), Mitsis (1993), Annas (1993) 96-108, and Sedley (1999). On the evidence of preserved book titles, cataloguing and classifying *kathêkonta* seem to have been a consistent Stoic practice.

discussed questions of rule-following and situational sensitivity. In Seneca's letters it the *value* of *praecepta* that is at stake, with Aristo presented as denying the moral relevance of these rules (at least for mature adults) by insisting that theoretical doctrines included within *decreta* are alone sufficient. Cleanthes and Seneca disagree.<sup>55</sup>

What we find is that Musonius develops an account of the importance of *askêsis* by suggesting that the person is synthesis of body and soul (ἐπεὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ψυχὴν μόνον εἶναι συμβέβηκεν οὔτε σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι σύνθετον ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν τούτοις) and that both parts need to be trained according to their specific nature.<sup>56</sup> One might assume then that the training of the soul neatly equates with theoretical knowledge and that of the body with developing its practical application. Yet Musonius' two types of training muddle this expected distinction. The first type focuses on the combination of soul and body, while the second is devoted to the soul alone.

In this second type of training, we find a strongly intellectualist account of the soul's progress to wisdom. Such development is characterized by coming to understand 'proofs' (ἀποδείξεις) that apparent goods are just that and in learning how to 'distinguish' (διακρίνειν) things which are truly good from those that merely seem so. This is to result in the practice of pursuing those things which are genuinely good and avoiding those that evil, however attractive they may seem. So, we see that the training of the soul is a matter of cognitively grasping certain points and learning to keep these available, mentally, for the practice of moral judgement.<sup>57</sup> This conforms neatly with the standard view that the Stoics insisted on a strongly intellectualist account of moral development involving the understanding of rules at different levels of generality. Mitsis puts this succinctly: 'The Stoics...are convinced that moral development depends solely on a deepening cognitive grasp of both universal and more determinate moral principles; they hold, moreover, that moral rules can structure our

---

<sup>55</sup> Aristo seems to deny the value of *praecepta* in the letter because of their alleged indeterminacy and superfluity. The historical Aristo is typically given a richer account. Sometimes this is explained as an objection, on situational grounds, to the generalisability of rules of action, suggesting an intuitionist account; see Inwood (1999) 104, Boys-Stones (1996) 75-94, and Annas (1993) 101-3. Sedley (1999) 130-1 suggests the point is rather that Aristo means to reject outright Zeno's attempt to make certain *indifferents* preferred. Thus, for a whole range of rules concerning health, wealth etc., there is simply no means of constructing acceptable rules of conduct; such moral rules would inevitably and illicitly make *indifferents* subject to differential calculations. See Sen. *De Ben.* VII 1 for an admiring account of Demetrius the Cynic's approbation of *praecepta*.

<sup>56</sup> A similar distinction between the training of the body and that of the soul is attributed to Diogenes the Cynic (DL VI 70). However, it is not quite parallel with Musonius' account.

<sup>57</sup> This is followed by Epictetus, cf. 3.3.14-16, 2.1.29, and 3.10.1.

understanding of a particular moral situation in ways that guarantee our sensitivity to its specific demands.’<sup>58</sup>

This familiar account is typically contrasted with Aristotle’s more particularist view of moral development and judgement, where reason alone is insufficient.<sup>59</sup> Strikingly, Musonius’ view of the training of the body-soul synthesis is formulated using the characteristic Stoic distinction between the truly and the merely apparent good; yet it appears to have far more in common with the Aristotelian, non-intellectualist view:

κοινή μὲν οὖν ἄσκησις ἀμφοῖν γενήσεται, συνεθιζομένων ἡμῶν ρίγει, θάλπει, δίψει, λιμῶ, τροφῆς λιτότητι, κοίτης σκληρότητι, ἀποχῇ τῶν ἡδέων, ὑπομονῇ τῶν ἐπιπόνων. διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ῥώννυται μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γίνεται δυσπαθές τε καὶ στερεόν καὶ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον, ῥώννυται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ γυμναζομένη διὰ μὲν τῆς ὑπομονῆς τῶν ἐπιπόνων πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀποχῆς τῶν ἡδέων πρὸς σωφροσύνην.

We use the training common to both when we discipline ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, meagre rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and patience under suffering. For by these things and others like them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring hardship, sturdy and ready for the task. The soul too is strengthened since it is trained for courage by patience under hardship and for self-control by the abstinence from pleasures.

As Inwood notes, this is clearly an account that emphasizes habituation in moral development.<sup>60</sup> Yet it is not quite the case, as he suggests, that Musonius’ point is simply that the body and soul have respective training requirements. The training achieved by physical habituation is common to both parts—body and soul—but Musonius does not presume that the benefits of such habituation accrue to the combined person but rather to the respective parts. Thus the point about understanding the person as a synthesis seems less a conceptual foundation and more a practical claim about the coincidence of the positive effects of bodily habituation on both body and soul. The connection between body and soul in this first type of training is merely that it consists in something beneficial to each in turn.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Mitsis (1993) 290. See Sen. *Ep.* 94.32, quoted by Mitsis. The salient point is that rules, grasped by reason alone, operate at every level of situational particularity.

<sup>59</sup> See Inwood (1999) 104, and Mitsis (1993) 287-290 for discussion of the comparison between Stoic and Aristotelian moral development. The latter makes the point that taking Aristotle to be a critic of intellectualism tells us little directly about how he conceived of moral rule-following, if he did indeed do so. The clear difference, according to Mitsis, between the Stoics and Aristotle, is that the latter denies that ‘moral development is solely the province of reason’. Burnyeat (1980) provides the classic discussion of Aristotle’s rejection of ‘Socratic’ intellectualism.

<sup>60</sup> Inwood (2017) 268. He notes, too, the use of Stoic axiology here.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. XIII B; there the thought is that the habituation of the soul to self-control and justice is a kind of disposition to virtue (ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφροσύνης).

The effect of this is that the soul is explicitly said to be improved by the examples of habituation Musonius provides, suggesting a non-intellectualist, non-cognitivist picture of how the soul is developed, at least in part.<sup>62</sup> It is not that the soul gains some cognitive benefit from experiences of privation, but that it somehow non-rationally becomes better by being accustomed to these through *askêsis*.<sup>63</sup> In Stoic terms, it seems that the experience of privation produces a morally relevant impulse (ὁρμή), independent of evaluative judgement and reason, that informs voluntary action and is explained as narrowly (i.e. not rationally) physiological.

What I mean by this is that none of the typical marks of Stoic rationality (e.g. being subject to assent or formulated as propositional content in *lekta*) is relevant for Musonius here; yet the psychological element of such training is obviously morally significant.<sup>64</sup> This, of course, is not to suggest that the cognitive elements of moral development are downplayed by Musonius, or that rules-based reasoning is irrelevant for him.<sup>65</sup> Yet we seem to have a clear and emphatic statement of the extra-rational effects of physical habituation on the soul.

What should we make of this? The first point to make is that Musonius is not concerned here merely with the pre-rational training of the young. Indeed the examples of training by privation in fr. XVIII-XX seem to suggest their value throughout one's life. It is also important that the Stoics accepted a corporealist view of the soul that was subject to bodily affections. At the basic level, this meant that the soul itself was *pneuma*, sustained by exhalations from the blood and the air.<sup>66</sup> If this is right, there is nothing in principle to prevent the corporeal soul, or some part of it, benefiting physiologically from the training Musonius has in mind.

A further point is that Galen's *PHP* suggests that there was significant attention devoted to the non-rational aspects or powers (*dunameis*) of Stoic moral psychology. In the case of Posidonius, we find a clear parallel for Musonius' two part understanding of *askêsis* as incorporating both rational and non-rational aspects of the soul.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Fr. LII ('To relax (remittere) the mind,' said Musonius, 'is to lose (amittere) it') is sometimes (e.g. by Laurant 2014, 67) presented as further candidate for evidence for an irrational aspect in Musonius' psychology.

<sup>63</sup> Houser (1998) 35-9 seems to suggest such a break in Musonius' account of the passions.

<sup>64</sup> I follow here the discussion in Inwood (1993) of five possible senses of reason for the Stoics. What is significant for Musonius is that we have morally relevant impulses that are independent of reason, even on the loosest sense outlined there.

<sup>65</sup> Even fr. XVI on obeying one's parents, which does much to suggest that Musonius does not accept what one might think of as an exception-less *kathêkonta* (see Inwood 1999, 103 n.28), explicitly confirms the moral usefulness of rules, as such. Much the same might be said of fr. XV.

<sup>66</sup> Reported by Galen (*SVF* II 782); see too II.841 and II.879. The soul, then, is subject to generation and destruction; cf. Plu. 53c.

<sup>67</sup> Laurant (2014) 68-9 attempts to block this move by maintaining that Posidonius never abandoned psychic monism, appealing to J. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 153-62. Yet the arguments found there are weaker than Laurant imagines, see Sorabji (2002) 99-108 for discussion. Cooper (1998), discussed below, suggests a way to read Posidonius' criticism of Chrysippus on emotional movements without accepting Galen's part-centred framework.



(a) ‘And the modes of training,’ says Posidonius, ‘are defined by the recognition of the cause of the emotions.’ (5.6.19-20, 168 EK).<sup>68</sup>

(b) For it is necessary both that this [the rational element] should acquire understanding of the truth and that the emotional movements should be blunted through habituation to good practices, if one is going to display a person with a better character. (5.5.29).

(c) The education and virtue of this [rational] element is understanding of the nature of things, as that of the charioteer is understanding of the instructions for driving chariots. For understanding does not get generated in the non-rational capacities of the soul, any more than in the horses. For these the proper virtue accrues from a kind of non-rational habituation, for charioteers from rational instruction. (5.5.35, 31EK).

In (b), we have Galen’s own account of the two aspects of habituation cast in a decidedly Posidonian framework.<sup>69</sup> In (a) and (c), we have direct quotations from Posidonius confirming Galen’s two part understanding of *askêsis* as involving both rational and non-rational capacities of the soul.

This comes within Galen’s complex attack on Chrysippus for failing to adopt a non-rational aspect of the soul, and instead taking the passions to be the product of mistaken judgements. Crucially, Galen reports that Posidonius also insists that the non-rational aspects of the soul can *only* be trained by something non-rational.<sup>70</sup>

Galen’s account is polemical and it has been subjected to significant scepticism.<sup>71</sup> The primary worry is whether Galen’s attribution to Posidonius of a Platonizing tripartition of the soul and a non-intellectualist account of *pathê* is plausible. The dominant, but not universally agreed, position in the most recent literature is to reduce the importance of the former and minimise or deny any role for non-rational factors in Posidonius’ psychology, at least at the level of rational adults.<sup>72</sup>

Cooper, for example, inaugurating one of the most plausible lines of interpretation, has suggested that we must understand Posidonius’ distinction between mere affective movements

---

He also suggests that because Musonius thinks humans are born with an inclination towards virtue (fr. II), contrary to Posidonius, he could not assume any irrational element in his psychology. Yet this proves little.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. 150 EK.

<sup>69</sup> Galen, for instance, speaks here of τὰς κατὰ πάθος δὲ κινήσει, echoing Posidonius’ terminology for ‘fully-fledged *pathê*’ (see Cooper 1999, 475). The introduction to this section (5.5.22) clearly suggests Galen is working from Posidonian material.

<sup>70</sup> οὐ γὰρ δὴ πον τὰς δόξας τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μεταδιδάσκονται πρὸς τῶν αὐλημάτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον ὑπάρχον ἐπεγείρονται τε καὶ πραῦνονται διὰ κινήσεων ἀλόγων. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγῳ διὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἢ τε ὠφέλεια καὶ ἡ βλάβη, τῷ λογικῷ δὲ δι’ ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀμαθίας.

<sup>71</sup> See, in particular, Tieleman (2003). Gill (2006) 266-290 provides an essential overview of the debate.

<sup>72</sup> See Long (2017) 29-32, and Gill (2006) 266-290. See Sorabji (2002) 94-108 for a useful account of the debate and a defence of much of the substance of Galen’s testimony.

(*pathêtikai kinêseis*) and more ‘fully-fledged’ *pathê*.<sup>73</sup> The latter are taken as complex functions that involve reason, judgement and assent and thus conform to Chrysippus’ intellectualism. The former are more ‘inchoate’ movements of non-rational powers that are best trained by habituation rather than argument.<sup>74</sup> Such an interpretation finds room for some improvement in the area of emotional movements for Posidonius without attributing to him any wholesale violations of central points of Stoic psychology. Thus we can discern a richer account of ethical development and its relation to rationality in Posidonius without accepting the Platonizing tripartition of the soul Galen appropriates in his polemical analysis.

In discussing this habituation, Posidonius draws inspiration from Plato and produces an epitome of his views on education (5.5.32). The question for us is whether Musonius follows Posidonius’ account here of how training relates to these lower-grade affective movements. In particular, does Posidonius preserve a place for the non-rational *askêsis* of the soul of adults? Clearly, the account we find in this epitome focuses on childhood, pre-rational education in which it was agreed on all sides, by definition, that non-rational children would need non-rational education.<sup>75</sup>

However, *PHP* 5.5.22-29, as Cooper notes, seems to suggest just such a role for non-rational habituation outside of the context of childhood.<sup>76</sup> This passage ends with (b) above and invokes the sort of environmentalist and physiological determinism familiar from Cicero’s discussion of Chrysippus in *De natura deorum* and *De fato* quoted above. Here such factors as warmth and hip measurement have moral entailments on bravery and pleasure-seeking behaviour. What is crucial is that the affective movements caused by such factors and their cures are in no way tied to pre-rational childhood education in this discussion. Some people, simply because of the construction of their bodies (τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευὴν), find the therapy for the emotions necessarily difficult.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Cooper (1999) 475. See *PHP* 4.7.28.

<sup>74</sup> Long (2017) 37-46 develops this line by suggesting that what Posidonius offers by making this distinction and associating it with childhood education is an improvement on Chrysippus, not through direct criticism, but by enriching areas left untouched.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Long (2017) 44-6.

<sup>76</sup> Cooper (1999) 477.

<sup>77</sup> Cooper (1999) 477 and Long (2017) 39 rightly note that Posidonius’ distinction between affective movements and full *pathê* allows him to give a complex account of one’s moral responsibility for such environmental or physiological factors. One is, of course, responsible for ‘fully-fledged’ *pathê* as they are subject to assent. But mere affective movements need not be vulnerable to such moral judgement. There is also the further question of whether the nature of immature human souls is simply different in kind to those of adults. For discussion, see Cooper (1999) 454-461. Musonius does not directly address this issue, but his insistence on the importance of raising all children born (fr. XV), and on the innate inclination towards virtue in humans (fr. II), suggest he would deny that childhood psychology was distinct in kind from that of the adult.

In this way, we find a more prominent role for (non-rational) habituation in Musonius' account of ethical development than is usually attributed to the Stoic picture and this role is not limited to non-rational children or non-human animals. Such a two-part analysis of human development is naturally attributed to the Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* and to Aristotle, as Christopher Gill has noted, and the distinction between habituating and rational training of the soul in Musonius does seem to recall these earlier texts.<sup>78</sup> Given the growing interest in Platonism evinced by Stoics of Musonius' period (e.g. Seneca's *Ep.* 58, 65), such a connection is highly suggestive, although I do not consider it in detail here.<sup>79</sup>

If this reading of Galen's evidence is along the right lines, we find a clear ancestor of Musonius' discussion of a two-part process of *askêsis*. Importantly, Galen does not only preserve an account of Posidonius' theory of the emotions but also the context in which he attempted to situate this theory. Posidonius, we learn, attempted to categorise his complex account of the soul as the same position held by Zeno and, particularly, Cleanthes.<sup>80</sup> He is even said to have quoted verses from Cleanthes (*SVF* I.570) to prove that he accepted an emotional element of the soul opposed to the rational part.<sup>81</sup> Following along these lines, it is not outside the realm of possibility to suppose that Musonius had the same tools as Galen to understand his non-rational type of *askêsis* as fully in keeping with the framework of Stoic debate, extending back to its start.

A final instance of parallelism between Musonius and Cleanthes that bears on this discussion is their shared position on the innate tendency towards virtue in humans.<sup>82</sup> Such a commitment helps in Musonius' case to explain why non-rational *askêsis* might be thought of as particularly effective. If humans naturally move towards virtue, we can understand why sub-rational habituation achieves some efficacy independent of reason. The force of fully-fledged cognitive development might simply not be needed in every case to bring about moral improvement in one already predisposed to virtuous action.<sup>83</sup> Training mere 'affective movements' might reap significant moral rewards.

---

<sup>78</sup> Gill (2006) 134-145.

<sup>79</sup> The response by those in the Stoic tradition to the rise of Platonism in this period is debated. For the view that Seneca and Cornutus, for example, adopted a strong anti-Platonist position, see Boys-Stones (2009) and (2013). A less polemical interpretation of Seneca's approach to Plato is offered by, e.g., Sedley (2005), among others.

<sup>80</sup> *PHP* IV. 377-9=34 EK and VIII.652-3=32 EK.

<sup>81</sup> *PHP* V.476=166 EK. See Menn (1999) 241 n. 34 for the suggestive thought that Cleanthes here fails to come to Chrysippus' mature position that the *λογισμός* and *θυμός* are the same thing differently disposed (*πῶς ἔχον*) because he lacks the full Stoic categorical scheme. Important too is his point that Posidonius' interpretation cannot have been 'obviously impossible'. See *SVF* I.370 for Aristo's understanding of *askêsis*.

<sup>82</sup> Fr. II and *SVF* 1.566=61L LS=Stobaeus 2.65.8.

<sup>83</sup> One might think, too, that Cleanthes' view on the corporeality of the soul is relevant for reconstructing his understanding of *askêsis*. Seneca (*Ep.* 113.23) and Sextus (*M.* 7.228-31) both suggest that Cleanthes is committed

Galen's evidence also indicates that an opposed, wholly rational training of the soul on the basis of eliminating false judgments might be associated with Chrysippus. The evidence is scanty, but it is just possible to associate him with such a theory.

Von Arnim, in the *SVF*, provides a quotation from Clement outlining such a theory of training that has a plausible connection to Chrysippus:

τριττὴ δὲ θεραπεία οἰήσεως, καθάπερ καὶ παντὸς πάθους· μάθησίς τε τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἂν ἐξαίρεθῇ τοῦτο· καὶ τρίτον ἡ ἄσκησις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ<sup>84</sup> ὁ ἐθισμὸς πρὸς <τὸ> τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἀκολουθεῖν δύνασθαι.

And the therapy for self-conceit, as it is of every ailment is threefold: coming to understand its cause, and how it is removed; and thirdly, the training of the soul, i.e. accustoming it to discern correctly in future judgements.<sup>85</sup>

We find here a version of *askêsis* of the soul that is strongly intellectualist. The habituation described (ἐθισμός) is a rational matter of perfecting the soul to make correct judgements. This is different in kind from Musonius' understanding of psychic *askêsis* as a habituation to *ponos* (toil), largely accomplished through privation, where critical judgement does not come into it.

Von Arnim's presentation of this quote from Clement's *Stromata*, where Chrysippus figures nearby, alongside passages from Cicero's *Tusculans* is significant. It is in this latter text that Chrysippus' cure for distress is offered, significantly overlapping with Clement's therapy. Distress, Cicero tells us, Chrysippus claimed can be rooted out completely (tota...evelli) by coming to understand its cause (explicata...causa aegritudinis), echoing Clement's emphasis on causal discovery.<sup>86</sup> We saw above that Posidonius also prioritized this causal element; the break comes in what this cause is determined to be. For Chrysippus, therapy is a matter of understanding and grief is determined to be the *false belief* that mourning is an obligation.<sup>87</sup> The solution is to be found in eliminating this false belief. Cicero's own report on Chrysippus' advice is telling: it is sound, in principle, but insensitive to the difficulty of the moment of grief (tempus aegritudinis difficilis). Cicero continues that it would be a great task to *prove* Chrysippus' point to someone in such a situation (magnum opus est probare maerenti illum suo iudicio).<sup>88</sup>

---

to a deeply corporealist view of human processes (i.e. walking and sensing) as involving different bodies present in the soul. If this is right, a physiologically-centered account of at least some species of *askêsis* seems to find a natural home in Cleanthes. Certainly, he would reject any view that discarded a corporeal counterpart for any instance of applying predicates to bodies, i.e. if it is true to say that soul was improved by *askêsis*, one must be able to point to something corporeal as an explanation.

<sup>84</sup> I take the καὶ here to be epexegetical.

<sup>85</sup> Clem. *Strom.* VII.16= *SVF* II 490.

<sup>86</sup> *SVF* III 483=Cic. *TD* III xxvi.63.

<sup>87</sup> *SVF* III 486=Cic. *TD* III xxxi.76.

<sup>88</sup> Cic. *TD* III xxxiii.79.

On these lines, we have at least two distinct Stoic accounts of *askêsis*, as it relates to the role of reason, indicating it was subject to some debate in the school. If this is right, we should be cautious about following Inwood in taking Musonius' remarks on *askêsis* to be the mere common property of philosophy. A far more engaged interaction with Stoic tradition on how Stoic theory relates to practical moral development is apparent.

With this in mind, the two approaches to food outlined by Musonius may be read as a case study in applying theoretical knowledge to practical judgement. We have seen that Musonius has a clear agenda to clarify this application. Notable, too, is the fact that there is a neat parallel between *askêsis*, understood as the training where the body affects the soul, and his discussion of food in fr. XVIII, where the function of bodily digestion bears on the health of the soul. The case of food is clearly a prominent, specimen application of Musonius' theory of *askêsis*. Indeed it seems that frs. XVIII-XX are intended to provide such examples of bodily *askêsis* and the broader, moral effects of such training. The concerted attack on luxurious food in XVIIIb, with Musonius' emphasis on its dangers, is a prime example. Similarly, the benefits of the experience of the cold and heat are repeated in XIX, echoing their contribution to the training of soul stated in VI. Finally, the effects of expensive furnishings are made plain in XX: extravagance leads to the confusion of the apparent good for the truly good, and so, to injustice.

In the case of food, the Cleanthean method demonstrates the difficulty of preceding from a top-down, theory-centric perspective without due consideration for its practical application in relation to human desire for the apparent good of pleasure. Food, as we have seen, is marked off by Musonius as emblematic of the siren call of bodily pleasure (cf. the intro to XVIIIa), and combatting hunger is a prime target of training through habituation. With only a precept about what one should eat derived from Stoic physical theory, one is as equipped as Musonius' novice who knows not to be overcome by pleasure but has no relevant practical experience. The effect of Cleanthes' neglect of human part of nature within the Stoic *telos* is made obvious.

The Zenonian perspective, on the other hand, precedes in a far more bottom-up fashion and works to match theoretical knowledge with its practical application. The principle that one must avoid being overcome by pleasure is clearly here, but so is the understanding of the pernicious consequences of yielding to the pleasures of delicate food, even in the case of illness. This suggests that Musonius is using Zeno to make a point about attending to the effects of pleasure. The consequence of succumbing once to pleasure is that one inevitably yields permanently. This seems to be an admission that the factor of the human body's susceptibility to pleasure must be considered relevant in understanding the practical application of theoretical

knowledge. Of course, Musonius' answer to the power of pleasure is just the sort of training discussed above that combines cognitive development of the soul with the non-cognitive habituation of both body and soul.

### ***Theory, Food, and Farming***

Two points of particular interest emerge from the above account. One, a close connection between food and the appropriate methodology for translating theory into practice is vividly reworked by Musonius' student, Epictetus. He, as Sellars has noted, frequently deploys an analogy between the habituation of philosophical principles and the process of digestion.<sup>89</sup> A clear example is found in *Discourses* III:

Those who have learned the principles and nothing else are eager to throw them up immediately, just as persons with a weak stomach throw up their food. First digest your principles, and then you will surely not throw them up this way. Otherwise they are mere vomit, foul stuff and unfit to eat. But after you have digested these principles, show us some change in your governing principle that is due to them; as the athletes show their shoulders as the results of their exercising and eating, and as those who have mastered the arts can show the results of their learning.<sup>90</sup>

Musonius explored the *topos* of food for the sake of elucidating the relation of theoretical principles to practical action. Epictetus is concerned with the very same translation of theory and furthers the theme by analogizing the process of digestion itself. The Cleanthean perspective here is 'mere vomit', a theoretical approach too quickly translated into a rule for action. Such principles need the Zenonian approach—exposure to the practical constraints of human nature and how it is exercised and improved. Food is not simply an especial locus of philosophical practice; it is transformed into an explanatory model for Epictetus for the proper philosophical life.

The second point that emerges is the relevance of Diogenes Laertius' life of Cleanthes. Zeno's encounter with the doctor and his prescription for squab is closely paralleled by Diogenes' account of Cleanthes last days:

His end was as follows. He had severe inflammation of the gums, and by the advice of his doctors he abstained from food for two whole days. As it happened, this treatment succeeded, so that the doctors were for allowing him to resume his usual diet. To this, however, he would not consent, but declaring that he had already got too far on the

---

<sup>89</sup> Sellars (2007) 131-34.

<sup>90</sup> *Diss.* 3.21.1-3. Trans. Oldfather. Other examples may be found at *Ench.* 46 and *Diss.* 2.9.18. Sellars suggests Sen. *Ep.* 2.2-4 as a comparandum. There we find the thought that great works must be 'digested' (innutriti), but the point is different. Seneca is making a general claim about the importance of slowly and carefully coming to understand a particular work before moving onto another. Epictetus is narrowly concerned with translating theory into practice.

road, he went on fasting the rest of his days until his death at the same age as Zeno according to some authorities, having spent nineteen years as Zeno's pupil.<sup>91</sup>

Diogenes' report that both Cleanthes and Zeno died at the same age invites us to draw the comparison, and Cleanthes fasting is consistent with the model found in fr. XVIIIa, where mere exhalations are sufficient to sustain human life.

Importantly, it is not just Diogenes' deathbed account of Cleanthes that rewards comparison with Musonius' fragments. In fr. XI, an eloquent defence of farming as appropriate for the philosophical life is raised. Working the land, we learn, whether as landowner or tenant, is intrinsically rewarding as the earth offers more than it receives. It is a noble livelihood suitable for free and good men, being independent of ties to others. Farming is also, Musonius argues, perfectly compatible with philosophical teaching and offers a sounder, more healthful environment for tuition than the city.

As often noted, we find Musonius entering here into a long-established discussion on the esteem due to agriculture seemingly cast into a sound Roman agrarian mould.<sup>92</sup> Xenophon, for example, holds agriculture in high regard as a means to profit and health.<sup>93</sup> Similar evaluations, including the suitability of farming for free men, may be found in Latin in Cicero, Cato, and Columella, among others.<sup>94</sup> Yet the status of the farmer himself, insofar as he is a manual labourer, is far from unambiguous, particularly in the Greek tradition. Both Plato and Aristotle diminish the status of the occupation, and, as Van Geytenbeek notes, the familiar distinction between farmer as labourer and farmer as estate-owner holds some relevance here.<sup>95</sup>

What distinguishes Musonius is his judgement that labouring as a farmer, and not exclusively as a country gentleman, is not only honourable but also particularly suitable for the philosopher. This is not a widely shared view, even in the Stoic tradition. Posidonius, for example, Seneca tells us, divided the arts into four *genera*, with manual work categorized as the lowest, lacking any *simulatio* to honour or beauty (*nulla decoris, nulla honesti*).<sup>96</sup> Yet the Stoics are not devoid of parallels for Musonius' approbation, and Cleanthes figures most

---

<sup>91</sup> VII 176. Trans. Hicks.

<sup>92</sup> See, e.g., Van Geytenbeek (1962) 129-34. Brunt (1993) 215-6 makes the case that Dio's views on rural life in his *Euboicus* were influenced directly by his teacher, Musonius. I take it that this is highly likely.

<sup>93</sup> *Oec.* 4.2-5 and 5.

<sup>94</sup> *De off.* 1.42.150-51; *De ag.*; and *De re rustica*, praef. 10-11. See Van Geytenbeek (1962) 132-3 for discussion.

<sup>95</sup> *Resp.* 415b-c, and *Pol.* 1331a.

<sup>96</sup> *Ep.* 88.21.

prominently here.<sup>97</sup> Diogenes tells us that Cleanthes was forced by poverty to work for a living in the garden of an employer, earning the nickname Phreantles, or water-drawer.<sup>98</sup>

Several points suggest Cleanthes provided a paradigm for Musonius' philosopher-farmer. First, while it is clear that Cleanthes undertook paid work in the garden for the sake of philosophy (ἀντλῶ γὰρ μόνον; τίδ'; οὐχὶ σκάπτω; τίδ'; οὐκ ἄρδω καὶ πάντα ποιῶ φιλοσοφίας ἔνεκα;), it is also the case that he did not view labouring as merely a means to end. He is said to have preferred his life to that of the wealthy, 'digging hard and barren ground', while they play ball (ἐν ᾧ σφαιρίζουσιν ἐκεῖνοι γῆν σκληρὰν καὶ ἄκαρπον αὐτὸς ἐργάζεσθαι σκάπτων). Second, the value of labouring is explicitly connected with philosophy. Cleanthes tolerates being called an ass because he can reply to the jeerers that he alone is able to carry Zeno's load, i.e. use his famed strength to assume leadership of the school.<sup>99</sup> The positive evaluation of labouring is confirmed by Zeno's approving remark that Cleanthes was so self-sufficient that he could maintain a second Cleanthes, while others are dependent on support from elsewhere. This dovetails neatly with Musonius' emphasis on the noble independence of the farmer.

Indeed, it is Cleanthes' esteem for labouring that earns him his explicit mention by name in fr. 1. Here Musonius relates the story of Cleanthes' encounter with a young Spartan boy who asks whether toil (πόνος) is a good thing. In admiration for the boy's question, verse-loving<sup>100</sup> Cleanthes quotes Menelaus' praise of Telemachus' noble blood from *Odyssey* 4.<sup>101</sup> This very same encounter, with somewhat less detail, is described in Diogenes' life, suggesting that Musonius was familiar with the standard details of Cleanthes' biography.<sup>102</sup> The mention by Epictetus, Musonius' student, of Cleanthes as a positive example of one who combined philosophy with his work in the garden further confirms this.<sup>103</sup>

A final example provides further reinforcement for the importance of the biography in Diogenes. In fr. X, Musonius discusses personal injury and litigation to make the point that the wise man would never take up legal redress for mere insults. This is accomplished on the sound

---

<sup>97</sup> Also, worth noting is the Cynic tradition from which Stoicism stems; see Dio Chrysostom 4.13, where Diogenes is said to take the earth to be the common hearth and nourisher of all. Brunt (1993) 229-232 suggests Dio's views on the poor and manual labour owe their origins to the early (*not* Middle) Stoics. He emphasizes Chrysippus in this respect, but does rightly mention Cleanthes' work in the garden. I take it that, in principle, we are in agreement that the early Stoa is most relevant for Musonius, even if I am sceptical about the evidence he adduces for the priority of Chrysippus.

<sup>98</sup> VII 168.

<sup>99</sup> VII 170.

<sup>100</sup> See Timon's μολύτης ἐπέων quoted at DL VII 170.

<sup>101</sup> *Od.* 4.611.

<sup>102</sup> Naturally, the question of how Musonius became familiar with Cleanthes' biography is relevant here. We can only speculate, but Diogenes does name Antisthenes and Demetrius of Magnesia as two of his sources. Philodemus' *History of the Stoics* might also be relevant here.

<sup>103</sup> 3.26.23-4; noted by Brunt (1993) 233. Seneca also draws attention to Cleanthes' work in a garden (*Ep.* 44.3).



Stoic and Socratic basis that a bad man cannot harm a good man and that a philosopher regards doing wrong as a disgrace but not in enduring such a wrong.<sup>104</sup> Musonius prominently mentions Socrates' equanimity in the face of Aristophanes' comic ridicule in his *Clouds* and his generous offer of himself to the poet for future parts. Cleanthes' biography in Diogenes contains a parallel event. He is said to have been present at the theatre when the poet Sositheus insulted his intelligence in verse. Instead of growing angry, Cleanthes, as Socrates, remained unmoved, and so shocked the audience that Sositheus was driven from the stage, earning Cleanthes applause. Mirroring Socrates post-play encounter with Aristophanes, Cleanthes accepts Sositheus' apology by remarking on the absurdity of growing angry at the theatre when the likes of Dionysus and Heracles accept such ridicule easily.<sup>105</sup>

As in the case of the book title *Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς* discussed above, the attribution of a *Περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν* (*On Litigation*) to Cleanthes may be relevant.<sup>106</sup> On the evidence of our preserved books lists, such a work on litigation is unique to Cleanthes and Chrysippus among Stoics. Such an interest in the law-courts is also supported by Diogenes' account of Cleanthes' experience as a defendant in a suit challenging the source of his income.<sup>107</sup> More importantly, Arius Didymus preserves Cleanthes' thought that the mark of a civilized *polis* is available recourse to legal judgement.<sup>108</sup> One might conjecture that the distinction between appropriate<sup>109</sup> and frivolous legal action underpinning Musonius' argument would have been made in such a work as *Περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν*. This is highly speculative of course but, I submit, not implausible.

To conclude this look at some of Musonius' diatribes: we have found evidence of a role for Cleanthes and earlier Stoic sources at the heart of some of Musonius' signature arguments. His characteristic focus on the practical application of philosophy is not developed by moving beyond the Stoic theoretical tradition. Arguments from Cleanthes and Zeno are compared to illustrate the nature of moral development and judgement for pedagogical purposes. The long history of the Stoic debate on *askêsis* and moral psychology is not ignored but shaped to strengthen Musonius' emphasis on practice. This suggests a philosopher making full use of the patrimony of his school.

---

<sup>104</sup> See Van Geytenbeek (1962) 134-142 for discussion.

<sup>105</sup> DL VII 173.

<sup>106</sup> DL VII 175.

<sup>107</sup> DL VII 168-9.

<sup>108</sup> SVF I 587.

<sup>109</sup> See SVF III 640.

### *Fate and Providence*

Let us conclude by briefly moving on to the shorter fragments. It is true that many of these traffic in wisdom that seems largely generic. In XXII, for example, Musonius suggests that living well is a product of assuming that each day is one's last. We find much the same sentiment in Marcus Aurelius (7.56), and the technique of assuming the worst is familiar from Posidonius (*PHP* 4.7.7-11) and Seneca (*Ep.* 91). The importance of a good, useful death is stressed in XXVIII and XXIX, and fits well with the general Stoic position on honourable suicide.<sup>110</sup> Others, like XXX on *aidos*, seem perfectly in keeping with wisdom in general, whether Stoic or not.

Yet not all the fragments are so generic. XLVII is a case in point:

‘Ρούφῳ τις ἔλεγεν Γάλβα σφαγέντος ὅτι ‘Νῦν προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται,’ ὁ δὲ ‘μὴ παρέργως ποτ’,’ ἔφη, ‘ἀπὸ Γάλβα κατεσκεύασα, ὅτι προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται,’

When Galba was assassinated, someone said to Rufus: ‘Is the universe *now* governed by providence?’ He replied: ‘Did I ever base my argument, that the universe is governed by providence, upon Galba?’

It is likely that Galba was responsible for Musonius' return from exile and, as Lutz notes, Galba's accession to power may well have been viewed as an act of providence after the murderous reign of Nero.<sup>111</sup> In this vein, her reading of the fragment focuses on a methodological point: Musonius is arguing that, just as he did not view his recall from exile as proof of providence, he does not now take Galba's murder to disprove its existence. The question at issue is epistemological and procedural: what evidence may be used to support the role of providential intervention?

Yet there is a simpler alternative that does not need the assumption of Galba's tight connection with Musonius' discussions of providentialism. Musonius' challenger is presenting the long-standing demand of any providential system's answers to the familiar questions of theodicy and the problem of evil: how can any beneficently organised universe allow for those events that seem harmful and malicious to us, like Galba's assassination?

This puzzle was at issue from the very beginning of the Stoic school. On the cosmological scale, the destruction of the universe maintained by their theory of *ekpyrosis* clearly remained a controversial commitment within the school long after its formulation by Zeno. Zeno of Tarsus, Boethus of Sidon, and Panaetius all either refused to commit to the

<sup>110</sup> See, most recently, Rauh (2018).

<sup>111</sup> Lutz (1947) 15 n. 52.

theory of conflagration or denied it outright.<sup>112</sup> The early Stoic triad of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus certainly did subscribe to the total conflagration.<sup>113</sup> However, it is likely that the cosmic destruction was cast by them in positive terms, and no tension between *ekpyrosis* and their providentialism was accepted.<sup>114</sup>

We do have evidence that the problem of evil on the local level was addressed by the Stoics using different means. Chrysippus seems to have suggested that physical evil (e.g. disease and infirmity) came about not directly by nature or providence, but *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν* (incidentally), as a sort of inevitable compromise of the divine providential ordering.<sup>115</sup>

More interesting for Musonius are the indications that there were attempts to drive a wedge between the standard Stoic identification of providence (Zeus), nature, and fate.<sup>116</sup> Two fragments of Posidonius (103 and 107 EK) suggest he might have developed a hierarchical distinction between the three powers. The evidence, however, is very slight and yields little despite several ingenious attempts at interpretation.<sup>117</sup> Our evidence for Cleanthes is clearer and suggests a connection with Musonius. Calcidius reports that Cleanthes differed from Chrysippus in distinguishing fate from providence.<sup>118</sup> He suggests that Cleanthes held that all things that come about according to providence also come about according to fate, but the inverse is not true: providence is less comprehensive than fate. Plutarch confirms Calcidius' report on their identification in Chrysippus;<sup>119</sup> this is Zeno's reported position as well.<sup>120</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> *SVF* III 1 Zeno Tarsensis 5; *SVF* III 6 Boethus Sidonius 7.

<sup>113</sup> *SVF* III 526.

<sup>114</sup> I follow here Mansfeld (1979). See p. 180 for the thought that Chrysippus held the conflagration to be 'a form of apotheosis'.

<sup>115</sup> *SVF* II 1169= Gell. *NA* 7.1.7-13.

<sup>116</sup> Fate and god: *SVF* I 102, I 160, II 928, II 931, II 932, II 1076. God, nature, and fate: II 937, II 945, II 1024. II 913.

<sup>117</sup> Kidd (1988) 414-18 provides a good overview and wisely suggests caution. See Edelstein (1936) 301-5 and Rist (1977) 203ff. for readings that accept a hierarchy of powers. Graeser (1972) 110 and Dragona-Monachou (1974) 286-301, suggest Posidonius' distinction is limited to questions of divination, with the latter emphasising how divination is to be accounted for. See Reydam-Schils (1997) 471ff., for further discussion.

<sup>118</sup> *SVF* II 551: eodeque modo quae secundum providentiam, ex fate, ut Chrysippus putat. alli vero quae quidem es providentiae auctoritate quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter, ex providential, ut Cleanthes. Dragona-Monachou (1973) 289ff. argues that Calcidius is interpreting Cleanthes' position rather than reporting it here. This makes some sense in the context of Calcidius' argument for his own Platonist position. Yet the *Hymn* confirms that this was indeed Cleanthes' view. I see no reason why we must think Calcidius is working merely from his interpretation of the *Hymn*. The clear antithesis he develops between Chrysippus and Cleanthes on this point is noteworthy and one might recall the evidence we have that Antipater wrote a book detailing the differences between the two early Stoics (Plu. *Stoic. rep.* 1034a= *SVF* III Antipater Tarsensis 66). It seems just as likely that Cleanthes' step outside strict orthodoxy was noted and distinguished from Chrysippus' position long before Calcidius.

<sup>119</sup> Plu. *Stoic. rep.* 1056c= *SVF* II 937.

<sup>120</sup> *SVF* II 160.

Cleanthes' insistence, then, on the non-identity of providence and fate seems to be a distinctive move on his part, even if there is the possibility Posidonius followed his lead.

It is hardly surprising that Cleanthes would develop such an understanding of providential action. One of the central themes of his *Hymn* is how human folly comes about despite Zeus' benevolent and rational ordering of the universe; it is a failure to see or hear God's law and a lack of understanding that leads to destructive ignorance.<sup>121</sup> Crucially, at v.17, human folly is explicitly said to be independent of Zeus. He is simply not responsible for human error, even if he is said to be for everything else on earth (v.15).

This brings us neatly back to Musonius and his reported remark on Galba's assassination. By denying that Galba's murder need be thought to come about according to providence, Musonius can counter his questioner's hoary criticism while not dismissing the universal causal nexus of fate that underpins Stoicism, is agreed on all sides in the school, and distinguishes them from the Epicureans. Notably, Musonius is elsewhere committed to this comprehensive role of fate (e.g. in XXXV and, particularly, XLII) in his deterministic view of the universe.<sup>122</sup> Of course, the likelihood of Musonius' familiarity with Cleanthes' *Hymn*, examined above, and its distinction between providence and human evil further recommends such a reading.

We find further support for the importance of Cleanthes for first-century discussions of Stoic determinism in Musonius' contemporaries. In both Seneca<sup>123</sup> and Epictetus<sup>124</sup>, the quotation of the same run of verses from Cleanthes on following what is fated plays a prominent role. Lacking context, it is impossible to get a firm grip on what Cleanthes' intended by these lines.<sup>125</sup> Yet, for our purposes, the relevant point is that Cleanthes' verses are a useful,

<sup>121</sup> vv.24-5, 32-3.

<sup>122</sup> I take it that this coheres nicely with Mansfeld's view (1979, 159, 186-8) that the hints of the difficulty of identifying fate with providence in the early Stoa are taken up by later Stoics for various ends. While Chrysippus and his predecessors notably refuse to make use of these difficulties in their discussions of *ekpyrosis*, later Stoics, including Boethus of Sidon and Diogenes of Babylon, do; see *SVF* III Boethus Sidonius 7 and *SVF* III Diogenes Babylonius 27 and, for their context, Philo *Aet. mu.* 47-118. Musonius, then, is following Stoic tradition and drawing on early worries about a central aspect of Stoic metaphysics.

<sup>123</sup> Sen. *Ep.* 107.11: Duc, o parens celsique dominator poli,  
Quocumque placuit; nulla parendi mora est.  
Adsum inpiger. Fac nolle, comitabor gemens  
Malusque patiar, facere quod licuit bono.  
Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

<sup>124</sup> Epic. *Enc.* 53.1: ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη,  
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος·  
ὥς ἔνομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,  
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔνομαι.

Cf. the partial quotation at *Diss.* 2.23.42. 3.22.95, 4.1.131, and 4.4.34.

<sup>125</sup> See Bobzien (1998) 346-51 for a careful, nuanced account.

widely cited authority for contemporary discussions of fate. Seneca's report is particularly interesting; he casts himself as a new Cicero in translating Cleanthes into Latin, adding a glossy veneer to Cleanthes' authority as the spokesman on fate for the Stoics (Cleanthes noster). Cleanthes is, and not for the first time, at the centre of things.

### Bibliography

- Annas, J. 1993. *The Morality of Happiness*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Baltzly, D. 2014. 'Plato's Authority and the Formation of Textual Communities' *CQ* 64, 793-807.
- Bignone, E. 1936. *L'Aristotele Perduto e La Formazione Filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia.
- Bobzien, S. 1998. *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. 1996. 'The ἐλευστική δύναμις in Aristo's Psychology of Action', *Phronesis* 41, 75-94.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. 2009. 'Cornutus und sein philosophisches Umfeld: Der Antiplatonismus der Epidrome', in A. Cornutus: Die griechischen Götter, edited by H. G. Nesselrath, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 141-161.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. (2013) 'Seneca Against Plato: *Letters* 58 and 65', in *Plato and the Stoics*, ed. A.G. Long, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. 2018. *L. Annaeus Cornutus: Greek Theology, Fragments, and Testimonia*, Atlanta, SBL Press.
- Brunt, P.A. 1993. 'Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and the Stoics', in *Studies in Greek History and Thought*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 210-244.
- Burnyeat, M. 1980 'Aristotle on Learning to Be Good', in: *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by A. Rorty, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Cooper, J. 1999. 'Posidonius on Emotions', in *Reason and Emotion*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Donini, P.-L. 1982. *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*, Torino, Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Dragona-Monachou, M. 1973. 'Providence and Fate in Stoicism and prae-Neoplatonism',

- Philosophia* 3, 262-300.
- Dragona-Monachou, M. 1974. 'Posidonius' "hierarchy" between God, Fate and Nature and Cicero's *De Divinatione*', *Philosophia* 4, 286-301.
- Dyroff, A. 1897. *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*. Berlin, S. Calvary.
- Edelstein, L. 1936. 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius' *AJP* 57, 286-325.
- Edelstein, L. and Kidd, I.G., eds. (1972-1999). *Posidonius*, 4 Vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Fillion-Lahille, J. 1984. *Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions*, Paris, Klincksieck.
- Van Geytenbeek, A.C. 1963. *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe*, Assen, Van Gorcum.
- Gill, C. (2006) *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 2005. 'Musonius Rufus' in: (1989-2012) *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, edited by R. Goulet, 555-72.
- Graeser, A. 1972. *Plotinus and the Stoics*, Leiden, Brill.
- Jaeger, W. 1934. *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, Trans. R. Robinson, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Hahm, D.E. 1977. *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, Ohio, Ohio State University Press.
- Hense, O., ed. 1905. *C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiae*, Leipzig, Teubner.
- Hopkinson, N. ed. 1988. *A Hellenistic Anthology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Houser, J.S. 1997. *The Philosophy of Musonius Rufus: A Study of Applied Ethics in the Late Stoa*, PhD Thesis, Brown University.
- Inwood, B. 1993. 'Seneca and Psychological Dualism', in *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, edited by J. Brunschwig and M.C. Nussbaum, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 150-83.
- Inwood, B. 1995. 'Seneca in his Philosophical Milieu', *HSCP* 97, 63-76.
- Inwood, B. 1999. 'Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics', in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, edited by K. Ierodiakonou, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 95-127.
- Inwood, B. 2017. 'The Legacy of Musonius Rufus' in *From Stoicism to Platonism*, edited by T. Engberg-Pedersen, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 254-76.
- Kidd, I.G. 1978. 'Moral Actions and Rules in Stoic Ethics', in *The Stoics*, edited by J. Rist, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Laurand, V. 2014. *Stoïcisme et lien social: Enquête autour de Musonius Rufus*, Paris, Classiques Garnier.

- Long, A.A., and Sedley, D.N. 1987, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 Vols, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- Long, A.A. 1996. 'Heraclitus and Stoicism', in *Stoic Studies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Long, A.G. 2017. 'Plato, Chrysippus and Posidonius' Theory of Affective Movements', in *From Stoicism to Platonism*, T. Engberg-Pedersen, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 27-46.
- Lutz, C.E. 1947. 'Musonius Rufus "The Roman Socrates"', *YCS* 10, 3-147.
- Mansfeld, J. 1979. 'Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought. With Some Remarks on the "Mysteries of Philosophy"', in *Studies in Hellenistic Religions*, edited by M.J. Vermaseren, Leiden, Brill, 129-188.
- Mansfeld, J. .2015. 'Heraclitus on the Soul and Super-Soul with an afterthought on the Afterlife', *Rhizomata* 3, 62-93.
- Mayor, J.B. 1880. *M. Tullii Ciceronis De Natura Deorum*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Menn, S. 1999. 'The Stoic Theory of Categories', *OSAP* 17, 215-47.
- Mitsis, P. 1993. 'Seneca on Reason, Rule and Moral Development', in *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, edited by J. Brunschwig and M.C. Nussbaum, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 285-312.
- Most, G.W. 1989. 'Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis', *ANRW* 36.3, 2014-65.
- Niehoff, M.R. 2007. 'Did the *Timaeus* Create a Textual Community?', *GRBS* 47, 167-91.
- Pearson, A.C. 1891. *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London, C.J. Clay and Sons.
- Pease, A.S. 1958. *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Pohlenz, M. 1948. *Die Stoa*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Rubrecht.
- Powell, J.U., ed. 1925. *Collectanea Alexandrina: Reliquiae minores poetarum Graecorum aetatis Ptolemaicae 323-146 A.C.*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Ramelli, I. 2001. *Musonio: Diatribe, frammenti, e testimonianze*, Milano, Bompiani.
- Rauh, S.H. 2018. 'Cato at Utica: The Emergence of a Roman Suicide Tradition', *AJP* 139, 59-91.
- Reinhardt, K. 1921. *Poseidonios*,
- Reinhardt, K. 1926. *Kosmos und Sympathie*. München, C.H. Beck.
- Reydams-Schils, G. 1997. 'Posidonius and the *Timaeus*: Off to Rhodes and Back to Plato?', *CQ* 47, 455-476.

- Reydam-Schils, G. 2005. *The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Reydam-Schils, G. 2017. ‘‘Becoming like God’ in Platonism and Stoicism’, in *From Stoicism to Platonism*, edited by T. Engberg-Pedersen, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 142-58.
- Rist, J.M. 1977. *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Schmekel, A. 1892. *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, Berlin, Weidmannsche
- Sedley, D. 1989. ‘Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World’, in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, edited by M. T. Griffin and J. Barnes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 97-119.
- Sedley, D. 1993. ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’, in *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, edited by J. Brunschwig and M.C. Nussbaum, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 313-331.
- Sedley, D. 1999. ‘The Stoic-Platonist Debate on kathêkonta’, in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, edited by K. Ierodiakonou, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 128-152.
- Sedley, D. 2005. ‘Stoic Metaphysics at Rome’, in *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought*, edited by R. Salles, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 117-42.
- Sellars, J. 2007 ‘Stoic Practical Philosophy in the Imperial Period’ *BICS* 50:94, 115-140.
- Solmsen, F. 1961. ‘Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics’ *Med. der K. Nederl. Akad.*, Deel 24, No. 9, 265-289.
- Sorabji, R. 2002. *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Thom, J.C. 2005. *Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck.
- Tieleman, T. 1996. *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Book II-III*, Leiden, Brill.
- Tieleman, T. 2003. *Chrysippus’ On Affections*, Leiden, Brill.
- Walsh, P.G. 1997. *Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Westerink, L.G. 1977. *The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo Vol II: Damascius*, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
- Zuntz, G. 1958. ‘Zum Kleanthes-Hymnus’, *HSCP* 63, 289-308.



